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Abstract
We estimate a panel vector autoregressive model to analyze the highly
disputed relationship between debt and growth. While several studies in-
dicate that high levels of sovereign debt hamper the growth prospects of a
country, our results question this. Using data on 20 developed countries, we
find no evidence for a robust effect on debt to growth, even for higher levels
of sovereign debt. We do find a significant negative reverse effect of growth
to debt, which explains the negative correlation.
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1 Introduction
Since the outbreak of the financial turmoil in 2007 and the subsequent sovereign
debt crisis in the euro area, the relationship between sovereign debt and economic
growth has been at the heart of the economic policy debate. In an influential
article, Reinhart and Rogoff (2010) document a historically negative correlation
between the level of sovereign debt and economic growth, and argue that countries
face a dramatic decline to their growth potential when their debt-to-GDP ratio
reaches 90 percent. Herndon et al. (2013) uncover a number of computational
errors in the results of Reinhart and Rogoff (2010). Although an observed negative
correlation between debt and growth remains, Herndon et al. (2013) challenge
the robustness of a ’90 percent threshold’. In addition, it is not clear that the
correlation implies causation. Does high debt lead to low growth, or does low
growth lead to high debt?
In an attempt to decompose cause and effect, we estimate panel vector autore-
gressions (PVAR) that describe the dynamic relation between sovereign debt and
economic growth, using data on debt and GDP for a panel of 20 developed coun-
tries ranging from the beginning of the 20th century. With both debt and GDP
treated as endogenous, the PVAR allows us to estimate both the effect of debt on
growth, as well as the reverse effect of growth on debt. We find that that the nega-
tive correlation between the variables is primarily driven by the impact of growth
on debt rather than vice versa. We find that an increase in growth has a negative
effect on debt, which makes sense given that government expenditure is in general
counter-cyclical, while government revenue is pro-cyclical. When controlling for
this negative effect, we find no evidence for a significant long-run reverse impact
of debt on growth. Results also indicate that the dynamics of debt and growth are
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remarkably similar across different subsamples and periods.
Previous studies have also addressed the endogeneity problem in the relation-
ship between debt and growth. For example, Baum et al. (2013) and Checherita-
Westphal and Rother (2012) apply instrumental variables to identify the effect
of debt on growth for euro area countries, while Minea and Parent (2012) use en-
dogenous threshold estimation methods. These studies find that at low debt levels,
deficit spending can have a positive impact on growth, which disappears or turns
negative for higher levels of debt. The estimated turning points in the debt-to-
GDP ratio vary substantially, with estimates ranging between 60 and 115 percent.
What these studies have in common is that they aim to find the short-run elastic-
ity of growth with respect to debt in different debt thresholds. Although this is
certainly an important question, we are more interested in the long-run effects of
debt on growth. A dynamic model like a VAR is a suitable choice for estimating
such long-run effects. After modeling debt and GDP as a bivariate dynamic pro-
cess, we produce impulse-response plots that visualize the path of both debt and
GDP for ten years after a shock hits either of these two variables. The shocks are
identified recursively.
2 Data and methodology
From the dataset of Reinhart and Rogoff (2009) we obtain data on gross govern-
ment debt. Data on real GDP per capita comes from the Maddison database of
the Groningen Growth and Development Centre. Our dataset comprises annual
data on 20 developed countries, over the period 1954-2008. For a smaller subset
of 10 countries, we are able to extend the length of the time-series, to the period
1905-2008. These countries are listed in Table 1. The table also marks those
countries for which the average debt-to-GDP ratio over the period 1954-2008 ex-
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ceeds 50 percent and for which the maximum debt-to-GDP ratio over the period
1954-2008 exceeds 90 percent. These subsets will be used in section 3 to compare
the results for different subsamples classified by the degree of indebtedness.
To analyze the dynamic relationship between debt and GDP, we compute
impulse-response functions from an estimated Panel VAR (PVAR), in a similar
manner as Lof et al. (2013) assess the relationship between aid and GDP in devel-
oping countries. Using the growth rates (log-differences) of real GDP per capita
(4Y) and the growth rate of total gross government debt per capita (4D) as our
variables of interest, we estimate the following PVAR:
yit = µi +Ayit−1 +εit, (1)
in which yit = (4Dit,4Yit)′, µi is a 2 × 1 country-specific intercept term (fixed
effect), A is a 2×2 coefficient matrix and εit is a 2×1 residual term. The subscripts
i and t denote country and year, respectively. The VAR includes only first-order
lags, which is selected using the Bayesian Information Criterion (BIC).
Before estimating the PVAR, we apply first-differencing, such that the fixed
effect µi drops out of the model. Afterwards, we estimate the differenced model by
GMM, while applying lagged values as instruments. This is a standard procedure
for estimating dynamic models with panel data, since the standard fixed-effects
estimator is in general inconsistent for such models (Nickel 1981). The resulting
estimate of A is used to compute the impulse-response functions. Confidence in-
tervals for the impulse-response functions are computed by bootstrap simulation,
see Lof et al. (2013) for details.
To identify the shocks, we impose a recursive structure, which makes the or-
der of the variables relevant. We follow Caldara and Kamps (2008), who note
that because of the delay between political decision making and actual govern-
ment spending, fiscal policy may have an instantaneous effect on GDP, while the
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reverse effect can only occur after a lag. We therefore place debt before GDP. As a
robustness check, however, we will also consider the VAR in the reverse recursive
order. In this case, it turns out that the imposed order has no substantial effect on
the estimated long-run impulse-responses.
3 Results
Figure 1 depicts the impulse-response functions derived from the estimated VAR
(Eq. 1). The figure shows the impact on debt (left column) and GDP (right col-
umn) for a period of ten years after a positive shock to either debt (top row) or
GDP (bottom row). Both debt and GDP are measured in per capita terms and are
transformed to growth rates by log-differencing. From the diagonal panels (top
left and bottom right) it appears that shocks to both growth rates of debt and GDP
are transitory: The effects of a shock die out within a couple of years, with shocks
to GDP (bottom-right) being clearly less persistent than shocks to debt (top-left).
The off-diagonal panels show the impact on debt, after a shock to GDP (bottom-
left) and the reverse impact on growth, after a shock to debt (top-right), which is
of our main interest. The top-right impulse response shows no evidence for any
significant effect of debt on GDP growth. A positive shock to GDP growth does
however have a significant negative effect on debt (bottom left), which persists for
about three years, after which the effect dies out. Based on these figures, it seems
the negative correlation between debt and GDP therefore results from the negative
impact of GDP growth on debt, rather than the negative impact of debt on GDP
growth.
The same results apply when we look at the levels instead of differences. Fig-
ure 2 depicts the cumulative impulse response functions from the VAR. By cumu-
lating the impact over time, these plots show the effect on the levels, rather than
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on the differences of debt and GDP (both in logs). Although the plots look dif-
ferent from Figure 1, the interpretation is the same. The top-left panel shows that
after a shock to debt, debt starts to accumulate for a couple of years, after which
the level of debt stabilizes. This shock to debt has no significant impact on GDP
(top-right). After a shock hits GDP, however, we can clearly see a negative impact
on the level of debt (bottom-left). GDP itself stabilizes nearly immediately at the
new level (bottom-right).
In Figure 3, we display the cumulative impulse response functions from four
alternative PVAR specifications. Compared to Figure 2, we display only the off-
diagonal panels, showing the dynamic effects of debt on growth (top) and vice
versa (bottom). First we consider the VAR with debt and GDP measured in ag-
gregate terms, rather than per capita (Figure 3.A). Next, we replace the level of
debt with the debt-to-GDP ratio (Figure 3.B). For Figure 3.C the recursive order is
reversed, such that GDP is placed before debt. Finally, in Figure 3.D, we consider
a subset of 10 countries (listed in Table 1), for which the VAR is estimated using
a longer time-series that spans from 1905 to 2008. Overall, the results in Figure 3
seem highly similar to those presented in Figure 2. The long-run effect of debt on
GDP is found to be insignificant for all four alternatives. Growth is found to have
a negative effect on debt. The only exception is Figure 3.B, where a GDP shock
seems to have no clear effect on the debt-to-GDP ratio. However, considering a
’structural shock’ that hits GDP but not the debt-to-GDP ratio is actually para-
doxical, given that these variables are by construction so intertwined. A recursive
VAR is therefore arguably not a suitable tool in this particular case.
Finally, Figure 4 reproduces the off-diagonal panels of Figure 2, for four dif-
ferent subsamples (listed in Table 1). Figure 4.A is produced using only the data
on 9 high-debt countries, for which the average debt-to-GDP ratio during the pe-
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riod 1954-2008 is higher than 50%. The remaining 11 countries are used for
figure 4.B. Next we look at 7 countries for which the maximum debt-to-GDP ra-
tio recorded during the period 1954-2008 exceeds 90%, which is the threshold
reported by Reinhart and Rogoff (2010). The remaining 13 countries are used for
figure 4.D. Like in the previous figures, we find no significant long-term impact
of debt on GDP. Regarding the reverse impact of GDP on debt, we find either
negative or insignificant effects. In general, the reported confidence bounds are
wider than in the previous figures, presumably due to the smaller sample sizes.
The overall picture from Figures 1-4 is clear: We find no significant long-run
effect of sovereign debt on economic growth. This result is robust to alternative
VAR specifications and to alternative samples.
4 Conclusion
High levels of sovereign debt are surely a burden to a country, but does it hamper
the macroeconomic performance in the longer run? According to our results, the
effect of debt on growth is ambiguous, at best. We find no statistically signifi-
cant long-run effect on debt to economic growth, for any elevated level of debt.
GDP per capita growth, on the other hand, is found to have a statistically signifi-
cant negative effect on sovereign debt. This implies that the negative correlation
between sovereign debt and GDP growth is mainly driven by the negative effect
of economic growth on sovereign debt. Our results are in line with Kimball and
Wang (2013), who claim in a recent blog post not to find "even a shred of evi-
dence in the Reinhart and Rogoff data for a negative effect of government debt on
growth".
We have chosen a rather simple model for growth and debt, in which the vari-
ables are treated as a bivariate process that is rather homogeneous across countries.
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Although this method is useful for decomposing the correlation, it is not very in-
formative about the economic channels through which debt and GDP affect each
other. Moreover, due to the recursive structure, the VAR is not well equipped to
estimate short-run effects. Directions for future research on the on the relationship
between debt and growth should therefore include multiple variables to uncover
these structural channels, which could also address possible omitted-variable bi-
ases. Regardless of these issues, the results of this paper make clear that when
estimating the long-run effect of sovereign debt on growth, it is important to con-
trol for the reverse effect of growth on debt.
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Table 1: Country list
Country 1954-2008 1905-2008 av. debt >50% max. debt >90%
Australia x x - -
Austria x - - -
Belgium x - x x
Canada x x x -
Denmark x x - -
Finland x x - -
France x - - -
Germany x - - -
Greece x - x x
Ireland x - x x
Italy x x x x
Japan x - x x
Netherlands x - x x
New Zealand x x - -
Norway x - - -
Portugal x x - -
Spain x - - -
Sweden x x - -
UK x x x x
USA x x x -
Notes: First column marks the countries for which time-series for 1954-2008 are available (N=20,
T=55). Second column marks the countries for which time-series for 1905-2008 are available
(N=10, T=104). Third column marks the countries for which the average debt-to-GDP ratio during
the period 1954-2008 exceeds 50% (N=9). Fourth column marks the countries for which the
maximum debt-to-GDP ratio during the period 1954-2008 exceeds 90% (N=7).
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Figure 1: Impulse-response functions computed from estimated PVAR (Eq. 1), for 20 countries
(See Table 1) over the period 1954-2008. 95% confidence bounds are based on 10,000 bootstrap
simulations.
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Figure 2: Cumulative impulse-response functions. See Figure 1.
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Figure 3: Cumulative impulse-response functions (See Figure 2) for alternative VAR specifica-
tions. (A) Debt and GDP measured in aggregate terms instead of per capita. (B) Debt measured
as Debt-to-GDP ratio. (C) Recursive order reversed. (D) Sub-sample of 10 countries (See Table
1) with longer time-series (1905-2008).
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Figure 4: Cumulative impulse-response functions (See Figure 2) for different subsamples (See
Table 1). (A) Av. Debt-to-GDP ratio>50% (N=9). (B) Av. Debt-to-GDP ratio<50% (N=11). (C)
Max. Debt-to-GDP ratio>90% (N=7). (D) Max. Debt-to-GDP ratio<90% (N=13).
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